In De Caelo III 2, Aristotle observes that each element is determined by an intrinsic principle to move to its proper place: earth downward, fire upward, and water and air to their respective places in the middle. However, how are we to determine the cause of elemental motion? Aristotle admits that this ranks among the most difficult problems (μάλιστα δ’ ἀπορεῖται) as it is directly related to the argument of Physics VIII 4, which defends the view that whatever is in (...) motion is moved by something. The question of how the elements move is not resolved until we are presented with his definition of inclination (ῥοπή) in De Caelo IV 1. Inclination is the nature of each element to move to its proper place. Aristotle concludes that the principle of inclination is a cause of motion continuously orienting the elements toward their proper places by activating that which is potentially heavy or potentially light. In what follows, I shall demonstrate the internal coherence of Aristotle’s natural philosophy by deploying inclination as a principle of motion and rest to define the nature of each element. This account of inclination as a principle of motion is consistent with Aristotle’s definition of nature in Physics II 1. As an active principle of motion, inclination is identified with the activity (ἐνέργεια) of the element enacting and maintaining its own end (ἐντελέχεια) by being at rest in its proper place. As a passive principle of motion, inclination is identified with the passivity of the element to be moved to its proper place by another element insofar as the respective element undergoes generation or substantial change. (shrink)

Throughout the tradition of Aristotelian commentary, there is a common tendency to present a static conception of substance according to the persistence of form imposed upon matter. In this essay, I present a dynamic conception of substance beginning with an account of the striving movement of the soul in De Anima. I argue that the paradigm for Aristotle’s definition of substance as actuality (entelecheia) is necessarily determined by his account of desire (orexis) as an efficient cause of the soul. The (...) striving movement of desire as an efficient cause fulfills a holistic function by providing a teleological unity to the various capacities of the soul. (shrink)

In the introduction to her book, Praxis und Logos bei Aristoteles, Friederike Rese rightfully bemoans a common prejudice within the secondary literature that mistakenly attempts to identify Plato, the so-called ‘idealist’, as the philosopher of λόγος and Aristotle, the so-called ‘realist’, as the philosopher of πρᾶξις. This traditional distinction between the philosophical life devoted to the pursuit of λόγος and the political life devoted to the pursuit of πρᾶξις as mutually exclusive forms of human activity also manifests itself as a (...) double tendency within Aristotelian scholarship: either to situate the theoretical philosophy above the practical philosophy, or to simply invert the hierarchy by emphasizing the practical over and against the theoretical. Both tendencies in their false play of oppositions generally fail to consider the comprehensive unity of both λόγος and πρᾶξις within Aristotle’s philosophy as a whole. By bringing into question some of these highly problematic divisions separating Aristotle’s theoretical philosophy from his practical philosophy, Rese aims to rehabilitate and recover the genuine transformation of λόγος within Aristotle in order to ultimately reveal its primordial unity with πρᾶξις. Rese’s aim is nothing less than to restore to Aristotle his rightful claim as the philosopher of λόγος: “If it was Aristotle who first described λόγος as the action of both reason and speech, then Aristotle was also the first who gave the concept of πρᾶξις its status as a philosophical term”. What really distinguishes Rese’s work from other works regarding the subject is the ingenuity of her central thesis, which focuses on the capacity of λόγος as a form of reason and speech to be responsible for both the determinacy and indeterminacy of human life and action. As a form of reason, λόγος establishes limits between determined and undetermined possibilities of action insofar as every determination of πρᾶξις must necessarily take into account those undetermined possibilities produced by λόγος. Rese’s thesis incorporates the principle of non-contradiction in Aristotle’s Metaphysics by designating λόγος as the limit of reason that orients a human being towards opposing possibilities of action. As a form of speech or saying, λόγος literally functions as the actualization of Aristotle’s principle of non-contradiction: “The same thing cannot at the same time both belong and not belong to the same object and in the same respect”. Every saying and deliberating of something is at the same time a delimitation of something from something else. Therefore, saying something is merely the performative aspect of deliberation which externalizes itself in the moment of decision determining the action. Because λόγος can produce a multiplicity of possibilities for any given action, the capacity of λόγος to exclusively determine an action separates human life from the indeterminacy of animal life. “While the possession of λόγος distinguishes the human being from all other life-forms, the activity of λόγος is also the actualization of life by arriving at the determining relation that characterizes the human being”. (shrink)